Wednesday 17 October 2012

Debt crisis in Greece - are there lessons to be learnt from the Latin American case?


Recently there have been many debates about the Greek crisis, its causes and potential consequences. With Greece being a member of the European Monetary Union many other countries depend on the situation in Greece. In order to know how to prevent Greece’s default and the potential meltdown of the European financial system there is a need to understand the history and origins of Greece’s debt crisis. As I will attempt to illustrate in this article at the core of the current crisis are fundamental imbalances in the level of consumption and income, which following years of reckless behaviour, brought the European integration project to its knees. 
In order to explain the origins of the crisis and provide a basis for the formation of an effective resolution, many lessons can be learned from past debt crises with a view to avoid taking the wrong policy decisions and efficiently work toward the restoration of confidence in sovereign bond and financial markets. I will therefore take a comparative approach and consider the parallels between the Latin American debt crisis of the nineteen eighties and the current debt crisis in Greece.
As this article will set out, while in both the Latin American (1980s) and Greek (late 2000s) case the trigger was an external shock, the key difference between the two is the structure of the total public debt. While Latin American countries affected by the crisis were characterised by a high proportion of short term debt in the total public debt, Greek was characterised by an overall high level of indebtedness, particularly external debt, accumulated over years of excess consumption with limited long term investment.    
This article will discuss the differences and similarities of crisis in Greece today and debt crisis in Latin America during the 1980 by analysing key economic indicators. Firstly, I will summarize the beginning of the debt crisis in Latin America (focusing on Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, and Mexico) and Greece and then compare their respective public debt levels, inflation rates and Gross Domestic Product.  

THE BEGINNING OF THE DEBT CRISES IN LATIN AMERICA AND GREECE
As Montiel (2003) pointed out, the problems for Latin American countries started in the 1970s when international inflation was high and nominal interests were relatively low and developing countries experienced rapid growth. These circumstances allowed the Latin American governments to borrow heavily and they accumulated a sizable stock of external debit by the beginning of the eighties. At the very end of the seventies the situation changed rapidly as oil prices increased and consequently in the early 1980s interest rates raised sharply which resulted in developing countries’ growth slowing down. With falling growth Latin American countries had problems in meeting their obligations and making interest repayments (El-Gamal et al, 2009). 
The financial crisis that started in the USA in 2007 and spread all over the world has not bypassed Greece. Even though almost every developed country has had heavy problems in resolving the crisis, Greece’s problems were even deeper and date back before 2007; the Greek government’s weak co-ordination and organization, high expenditures in comparison to revenues, corruption, tax evasion, weak welfare system and inflexible employment laws (Muhammad et al, 2011). Before entering the Eurozone, Greece needed to satisfy the criteria  set out in the Maastricht Treaty in order to adopt euro as its own currency. Greece entered the Eurozone on 1 January, 2001 and by becoming a member of European Monetary Union (EMU) funds started to flow into the country, mainly German funds (Arghyrou and Tsoukalas, 2010). Markets perceived that the EMU countries had a vested interest in Greek reforms and Greece’s continued participation in the EMU (Arghyrou and Tsoukalas, 2010). After 8 years of entering the Eurozone it surfaced that Greece lied about its circumstances by misrepresenting its monetary and fiscal results (Muhammad et al, 2011). The reason behind the Greece crisis was the behaviour of its institutions, as they behaved dysfunctional which was neither forecasted nor expected (Muhammad et al, 2011).
Latin American countries in the 1980s and Greece today have a common feature high external debt and both Latin America and Greece depended on the economic situation in foreign countries, specifically on the credit inflows from these countries.


PUBLIC DEBT AND GOVERNMENTS’ EXPENDITURES

During the 1980s the largest Latin America debtors were Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela (Guidotti and Kummar, 1991) and in Europe today one of the largest debtors is Greece, followed by Portugal, Ireland, Spain and Italy (The Economist, 23 April 2011). This section will compare available data about public debts and governments’ expenditures within the countries and will illustrate how healthy these economies were over the observed period. 
Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela accumulated their public debt over the years. Graph 1 shows their total and external debt as percentage of GDP between 1976 and 1988.  From the graph is visible that there was a constant growth of total debt till the 1987 when total debt started slightly to decrease. The culmination of public debt was in 1986 when it was more than 50 per cent of GDP and external debt was more than 30 % of GDP. From 1976 external borrowing grew steadily till the 1986 when it finally started to decline.


Graph 1: Total public debt and external public debt for Four Largest Debtors, 1976-88 (percentage of GDP)
Source: Guidotti and Kummar (1991)

A key characteristic in the management of public debt is the debt maturity where long-term debts (bonds) are desirable since they help in stabilizing inflation and prevent “credibility  crises” (Guidotti and Kummar, 1991). The debt structure of Latin American during the 1980s was heavily geared towards short term debt, as set out in the table below.


Short-Term Debt/Total Debt
Country
1982-1988
1987-1988
Argentina
63.3
73.7
Brazil
100.0
100.0
Chile
48.3
31.8
Mexico
73.8
71.8
Table 1: Debt Maturities, 1982-88 and 1987-88 (in per cent)
Source: Guidotti and Kummar (1991)

Brazil’s total debt fully consisted of short-term debt while over 50 per cent of total debt was short-term debt in Mexico and Argentina. The reasons for that structure probably lay in the lack of credibility of Latin countries which prevented them from issuing long-term bonds (Guidotti and Kummar, 1991). The exception was Chile which had less than 50 per cent of short-term debt. 
As for Greece, it most recently became obvious that Greece lived far beyond its means as illustrated in graphs 2 and 3. Government consumption consistently exceeded total government revenue. Most strikingly, the gap between expenditures and revenues widened in 2009 due to the sharp drop in economic activity and private sector demand. From 2000 Greece’s government expenditures were constantly higher than revenues and in 2009 expenditures reached over 50 per cent of the GDP. The year 2009 was the year when the Greek crisis exploded, when its credibility was shifted down and when it was placed very high for the corruption (Muhammad et al, 2011).

Graph 2: General government revenues and expenditures, 2000-2010 (as percentage of GDP)
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, September 2011




















At the time of joining EMU, in 2001, Greece’s debt-to-GDP ratio was over 100 %, and it means that Greece could not have met one of the Maastricht Treaty criteria, whereas the debt-to-GDP ratio needed to be below 60%. In the following four years there was a slight decrease of debt, it even fall below 100 %, but in 2006 it exceeded the percentage in 2000 and 2001. From 2006 there is a constant rise of debt and from 2008 it sharply increased. By the end of last year 80% of Greek debt was being held abroad (Muhammad et al, 2011).

Graph 3: General government gross debt , 2000-2010 (as percentage of GDP)
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, September 2011




















INFLATION 
Since Latin American countries had a problem with insolvency, their central banks started to print money in order to be able to repay the debts and one of the consequences was a high inflation (Montiel, 2003). This had the effect of pushing up inflation rapidly over a short period of time. The graph below illustrates the rate of inflation during the 1980s in major Latin American countries. 


1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
Argentina
100.76
104.48
164.78
343.80
626.73
672.18
90.09
131.34
342.95
3079.46
Brazil
90.22
101.73
100.54
135.03
192.12
225.99
147.14
228.34
629.12
1430.72
Mexico
26.47
27.95
59.15
101.86
65.44
57.75
86.39
131.90
113.66
19.94
Venezuela
21.36
16.24
9.61
6.24
12.25
11.38
11.54
28.14
29.47
84.46
Table 2: Inflation (average consumer prices), Four Largest Latin American Debtors, 1980-1989
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, September 2011

Graph 4: Inflation rates, 1980-1989
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, September 2011























Argentina and Brazil suffered from hyperinflation. In 1989 Brazil’s inflation reached more than 1400% and Argentina’s was even higher, at an extraordinary 3079%.  Mexico’s highest rate of inflation was in 1987 when it reached 132%, while Venezuela experienced high inflation at the very end of the eighties. 
In contrast, Greece did not suffer from hyperinflation and its inflation rates ranged between 1.3 and 4.7 % over the last ten years, as shown in the graph 5. Even though that Greece’s inflation rate were not so high, they were constantly higher that the EMU average. After world finical crisis attack, both Greece and EMU countries experienced a sharp fall of inflation but for very short period of time. From 2009 the inflation rates are rising.

Graph 5: Inflation rates (Consumer prices), 2000-2010, Eurozone countries and Greece
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, September 2011























GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT
Another proof of the “lost decade” (phrase which refers to the experience where countries had lower GDP at the end of the decade than at the beginning; Montiel, 2003) is seen in the graph below which shows the volatility of GDP of four largest debtors during the eighties. Four largest debtors, Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela and Mexico experienced instability, their GDP fall and rose with no particular order and each year brought different outcome.

Graph 6: Gross Domestic Product for Four Largest Debtors, Constant Prices, 1980-1989 
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, September 2011






















In contrast, Greece’s GDP was relatively more moderately volatile between 2000 and 2010,  in fact till 2008 Greece’s GDP growth was constantly positive, with minor falls in the growth rate between 2000 and 2002, 2003 and 2005. However, when the global financial crisis reached its peak in later 2008/2009, Greece’s GDP fell dramatically indicating severe recession in Greece.

Graph 7: Gross Domestic Product, Greece, 2000-2010 
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, September 2011





















OUTCOMES AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
In both the Latin American (1980s) and Greek (late 2000s) case the trigger for debt crisis was an external shock, yet this is the only thing they have in common. Latin American countries in 1980s were developing countries and they were not in monetary union and Greece today is developed country and it is in the monetary union.  Taking this into consideration it can be easily assumed that their economic indicators are not the same, not even similar. There is difference in the structure of the total public debt. While Latin American countries affected by the crisis were characterised by a high proportion of short term debt in the total public debt, Greek was characterised by an overall high level of indebtedness, particularly external debt. Inflation trends in case of Latin America were significantly different from Greece’s inflation; Latin American countries in the 1980s experienced inflation from 6% to extraordinary 3049% (at the end of the decade) and Greece’s inflation was not even close to these figures, but its inflation was constantly higher than EMU countries average.   Gross Domestic Product of the Latin American countries in 1980s was instable and each year had a different outcome, while Greece’s GDP was relatively stable over time. However, when the global financial crisis reached its peak, Greece’s GDP fell dramatically indicating severe recession in Greece.
There were few attempts for reducing the debt crisis in Latin America. In the mid-eighties the USA announced the Baker Plan, a programme designed to partially restore flows of commercial credits (Pastor, 1993). When this plan had almost no success, in 1989 the USA suggested a new approach, the Brody Plan which was based on rewarding more conservative regimes with partial debt relief where International Monetary Fund and World Bank agreed to offer resources to back debt-reduction programmes for countries with viable economic programmes (Rhode, 1992).  The Brody Plan at the end resolved the debt crisis.
The global financial crisis that started in 2007 was just further exacerbated by the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis. The uncertainty caused by the recklessness of Greece has prompted the two largest Eurozone economies, Germany and France to take the lead and try to figure out how to best help Greece and prevent a total collapse of the region’s economic and financial system (Muhammad et al, 2011). The EU, IMF and ECB (“Troika”) have provided Greece with loans in order cover its budget deficit without default. In May 2010 agreement was reached between International Monetary Fund, euro area members and Greece about 110 billion euro heavy package. On 21 February 2012, EU Member States agreed to a new 100 billion euro loan and in exchange Greek government is forced to impose strict fiscal austerity which makes Greeks angry. Reasonable, cuts are indeed painful.
However, is it possible to resolve the debt crisis in Greece and make everybody happy? It appears that no one knows for sure. Some think that the Brody Plan can be a good solution for Greece (and the Eurozone) and others think that the only solution for Greek survival is leaving the Eurozone.  Some go even further; Greece should be left to default.
It is known how and when Latin American debt crisis ended up, but it is difficult to say for how long  the “Greek tragedy” will last.




REFERENCES
1. Arghyrou, M. G., Tsoukalas, J.D., (2010) “The Greek Debt Crisis: Likely Causes, Mechanics and Outcomes”. Cardiff Business School Working Paper Series. [online] Available at: http://business.cardiff.ac.uk/sites/default/files/E2010_3.pdf 
2. Baskaran T. (2009). Did the Maastricht Treaty Matter for Macroeconomic Performance? A difference-in-difference investigation. KYKLOS, 62(3), pp. 331–358 [online] Available at: JSTOR 
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6. Guidotti, P., Kumar, M. (1991). Domestic Public Dept of the Externally Indebted Countries. Occasional Paper 80. IMF
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http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2011/02/weodata/index.aspx  
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11. Pastor, Manuel Jr. (1993) Managing the Latin American Debt Crisis: The International Monetary Fund and Beyond. Epstein, G., Graham, J., Nembhard, J. (ed) Creating a New World Economy: Forces of Change and Plans for Action.  Philadelphia: Temple University Press, pp 289-313.
12. Rhode, W. R. (1992) The Disaster that didn’t happen. The Economist; 324(7776), pp.21-23 [online]. Available at: Business Source Premier 
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14. Eurostat (2011) General government gross debt [online]. Available at: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&plugin=0&language=en&pcode=tsieb090
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16. Margaronis, M. (2011) Greece in Debt, Eurozone in Crisis. Nation. 293 (3/4) Available at: Business Source Premier






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